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Cosmopolitans like Gillian Brock, Charles Beitz, and Thomas Pogge argue that the principles of justice 
selected and arranged in lexical priority in Rawls’ first original position would—and should for the same 
reasons as in the first—also be selected in the second original position. After all, the argument goes, what 
reasons other than morally arbitrary ones do we have for selecting a second set of principles? A different, 
though undoubtedly related, point of contention is the cosmopolitan charge (most famously, made by 
Pogge) that Rawls fails to consider the unfavorable conditions that owe themselves to global factors. 
Perhaps there was a time when interconnectedness and interdependency between states was not a factor; 
but in the current global order, this certainly is not the case. While this paper will address other related 
cosmopolitan concerns mentioned in Brock’s work, it is these two points that are perhaps the two biggest 






In the first part of this paper, I will present what I take to be the central objections to the 
Rawlsian project of the Law of Peoples, hereafter LP, that are presented in Gillian 
Brock’s Global Justice. In the second part of this paper, I will argue that the Rawlsian 
project, correctly understood, is not as vulnerable to the central cosmopolitan criticisms 
as Brock seems to suggest. I do this by offering what I take to be a fundamental, though 
perhaps often overlooked, key to understanding the Rawlsian project: a peoples’ 
capacity for self-sufficiency.1 I also argue that the implication of this fundamental key 
is sufficient for reconciling what Brock sees as an inconsistency between the Rawlsian 
project of offering an account of global justice in LP and Rawls’ previous liberal 
commitments from Theory of Justice, hereafter TJ, and Political Liberalism, hereafter 
PL. It is my hope in this paper to demonstrate how, contrary to the cosmopolitan charge 
of inconsistency, it precisely by different principles being selected—namely without 
global difference principle—that Rawls is consistent.2 Finally, the last part of this paper 
posits that Rawls would likely respond—and on some level does respond —to Brock’s 
criticisms in a more satisfying way than she seems to suggest.  
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Central objections to Rawls’ Law of Peoples 
 
The cosmopolitan charge against Rawls presented in Brock’s Global Justice is that 
Rawls is tolerant of economic injustices at the global level that Rawls is so vehemently 
intolerant of at a domestic level. The cosmopolitan complaint is that the same 
inequalities that are not to the greatest advantage of the least well-off that are not 
permitted on the domestic are permitted on the international level.  
 
Cosmopolitans, as pointed out by Brock, charge Rawls with being inconsistent 
regarding what principles are appropriate for governing in the LP from the principles of 
governing found is his earlier work, in TJ and PL. As Brock wants to say, 
cosmopolitans argue that if structuring a society behind an appropriate veil of ignorance 
(which excludes our knowledge not of the world but of our place in it), then factors 
such as place of birth and borderlines are also arbitrary from a moral point of view. So, 
the argument goes, a different set of principles should not be chosen in a second 
original position.  
 
The cosmopolitan argues that the principles of justice selected and arranged in lexical 
priority in the first hypothetical position would—and should—also be chosen in the 
second. Cosmopolitans maintain that just as sex, race, and talents are morally arbitrary, 
so is place of birth. So, as the argument goes, if we accept place of birth to be yet 
another arbitrary condition, then consistency requires that when deliberating behind the 
veil, the principles of justice that will be selected will be those which work to the 
maximum advantage of the globally least well-off. That is to say, a global difference 
principle would be selected. The principle of most contention, and the one that most of 
this paper will focus on, is the endorsement at the international level of principle 2a: the 
“difference principle” (or, what is known as the “maximin” principle of welfare 
economics).    
 
As Brock seems to suggest, Rawls’ project of offering an account of global justice in 
LP is inconsistent with Rawls’ previous liberal commitments from TJ and PL. I will 
argue that this is not the case. Furthermore, Rawls still carries over from his earlier 
work in TJ and PL to his work in the LP his idea of an “overlapping consensus” 
regarding the principles of justice being made in an environment of reasonable 
pluralism.  
 
Central to understanding the Rawlsian project 
 
I am arguing that the point that the criticisms provided by Brock seem to miss is the 
very point that is the key to understanding the Rawlsian project. Understanding the 
implications of, and motivations behind, one of the eight global principles delegates 
would choose when deliberating behind a second appropriate “veil of ignorance” is 
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central, though perhaps overlooked, to understanding the Rawlsian project. Not only 
does Brock seem to miss this, but the defenses she provides for Rawls seem to miss the 
motivations behind this point this as well: “Peoples are free and independent, and their 
freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.”3 
 
Looking closely at this leads us to see that it is not the case that Rawls is inconsistent or 
changing his position from his earlier liberal commitments set forth in TJ and PL. It is 
that Rawls is acknowledging that peoples can live independently of other peoples in a 
way that individuals on a domestic level cannot. That is to say, peoples have the 
capacity to be self-sufficient and individuals do not. Peoples can, despite their current 
conditions, become self-sustaining and live independently of other peoples while 
individuals cannot (or at least not in the same way). It is this point that demonstrates the 
difference between peoples and individuals in a way that is significant to the Rawlsian 
project. And it is this difference, I want to argue, that explains why a different set of 
principles (namely, without a difference principle) would be chosen, and rightly so.  
 
So it is not that, contrary to popular cosmopolitan belief, Rawls changes his position. 
Rather, it is that Rawls—and delegates in the hypothetical position—acknowledge a 
significant difference between peoples and individual persons. And if peoples differ in 
a significant way from individuals, would it not make sense that a different set of rules 
or principles ought to apply?  
 
The defenses of Rawls provided in Brock’s work attempt to defend Rawls based on the 
misunderstanding critics have concerning the purpose of Rawls’ work. These defenders 
want to say that Rawls’ LP asks a less ambitious question: how should liberal peoples 
interact with non-liberal peoples.4 Joseph Heath wants to say that, “Just as Rawls’ 
primary objective in Theory of Justice was to argue against utilitarianism, in the Law of 
Peoples it is to dislodge realism” (30). However, while the claims of these defenses 
may be true, these defenses fail to show why Rawls’ project is going in the direction 
that it is. The defenses offered in Brock’s book fail to show the point of how peoples 
differ from individuals as being a motivation behind Rawls’ project.  
 
Defense against the charge of inconsistency 
 
Now that I have explained the fundamental difference—the difference that is relevant 
to the Rawlsian project—between peoples and individuals, I will now argue that it is by 
different principles being selected—namely without a global difference principle—that 
Rawls is consistent. It is now my hope to show that if the same principles were to be 
selected, it is then that Rawls would be inconsistent. This defense against the charge of 
inconsistency rests on something that Rawls stays committed to since TJ and PL and on 
through to LP: the priority of self-respect.5 The point is that by different principles 
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being selected, Rawls is securing the interests behind the principles rather than securing 
the principles themselves. 
 
Individuals’ wealth and their roles in a social hierarchy cannot be guaranteed equal. If 
one’s self-respect is tied to these things, knowledge of one’s subordinate ranking in a 
society can be a threat to one’s self-respect. While equal roles or statuses in a society 
cannot be guaranteed, equal citizenship can. As such, it is thought by Rawls that equal 
citizenship can play this role of securing self-respect in a way that one’s status in a 
social hierarchy cannot. It is for this reason of providing a secure basis for self-respect 
that Rawls gives lexical priority to the Liberty Principle.6 Given that—for the sake of 
securing self-respect—the Liberty Principle is given lexical priority, the Difference 
Principle comes only after, and never at the expense of, the Liberty Principle.  
 
Rawls was clearly committed to self-respect taking priority over a difference principle 
in his work on domestic justice in both TJ and PL. Rawls was also clear that not only 
was the Difference Principle to come second to the Liberty Principle, but that is was 
also intended to serve as further support for the first principle. Rawls was clear that his 
commitment was to self-respect over a difference principle.  
 
A closer look at this allows us to see that if the same principles were to be selected on 
the global level as were selected on the international level, then Rawls would be 
inconsistent. That is to say, it is by different principles being selected (namely without 
at global difference principle) that Rawls is consistent. Rawls gives priority to self-
respect over a difference principle on the domestic level, and Rawls also gives priority 
to self-respect over a (global) difference principle on an international level.7   
 
In LP, Rawls argues that it is the case that a peoples’ self-respect also cannot be tied to 
wealth. Rawls is clear on this point in LP. Rawls argues that a peoples’ “wealth lies 
elsewhere; in their political and cultural traditions… and in their capacity for political 
and economic organization”. That is to say, their self-respect is in some meaningful 
sense tied to their meaningful political projects. A global difference principle is a threat 
to a peoples’ self-determination and, given that a peoples’ self-respect is tied to this, 
selecting a difference principle at the global level would violate Rawls’ earlier 
commitment to the priority and importance of self-respect. Thus, contrary to 
cosmopolitan criticisms, consistency requires a different set of principles (namely 
without a global difference principle) be selected.  
 
The acceptance of a difference principle on the global level and the rejection of a 
difference principle on the international level are both attempts to secure the same end: 
the self-respect of a peoples on the international level and the self-respect of individuals 
on a domestic level. The acceptance of one and rejection of the other owes itself to the 
significant difference between the domestic level and the international level (viz. the 
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capacity for self-sufficiency). Thus, Rawls is making this move to secure the interests 
behind the principle rather than the principle itself.  
 
More satisfying Rawlsian response 
 
The implications of the difference between peoples and individuals, correctly 
understood, is fundamental to understanding why Rawls’ position is not as vulnerable 
to the central cosmopolitan criticisms mentioned in Brock’s work as she seems to 
suggest. The point is that, Rawls would argue, once a peoples reach the level of 
subsistence (or once they are brought to the level of subsistence via others’ duty of 
assistance), a peoples’ primary concern is maintaining and preserving its autonomy. 
That is to say, self-determination and the self-respect that comes of it is a significant 
part or their collective aim. The sense of pride and self-respect that comes of being a 
self-determining peoples cannot be had if one is dismissive of the significance of the 
first of eight principles selected: “Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom 
and independence are to be respected by other peoples” (LP, p. 37).  
 
While it may be the case that, as Pogge wants to say, a degree of interdependency exists 
and is the cause of unfavorable conditions for some, this in no way is a threat to Rawls’ 
project. Focusing on the interdependency that does exist between states as being a 
problem for Rawls’ work further demonstrates how the purpose of Rawls’ work is 
either misunderstood or ignored. Regardless of the fact that, as Pogge and Beitz want to 
point out, a level of interdependency or interconnectedness exists in the current global 
order, it need not exist among peoples in a way that it is necessary to exist among 
individuals. That is to say, regardless of whether or not a peoples does at the moment 
live independently (as Pogge says they do not), the point is that, unlike individuals, 
peoples can live independently. 
 
Pogge’s claim that unfavorable conditions owe themselves—at least in part—to global 
factors may not be wrong in itself; however, this is a claim criticizing Rawls’ account 
of international distributive justice when international distributive justice is not even the 
purpose of Rawls’ project. Rawls’ aim in the LP is not to give an account of 
international distributive justice, but to give an account of how a liberal peoples is to 
live in a world with other liberal and non-liberal but decent societies.   
 
While Pogge’s criticism is not a threat to the Rawls’ project, Rawls would still respond 
in a more satisfying way than Brock seems to suggest. In arguing for Rawls’ difference 
principle to be extended beyond borders, Pogge brings up the point (perhaps rightly so) 
the harm done to states by factors external them (i.e., global factors of 
interconnectedness). However, Rawls would respond by saying that this is where the 
role of a “duty of assistance” would come in. And a “duty of assistance”, the Rawlsian 
would say, to undo harm done to states would not require a global difference principle.  
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A global difference principle would not be chosen because of the threat to a peoples’ 
political autonomy it carries with it. Rawls is clear in saying throughout the LP that a 
decent hierarchical society’s self-respect is tied to the moral significance of its self-
determination and political autonomy rather than to its material wealth. A critic of 
Rawls may respond by saying that a decent society’s self-determination is threatened in 
the absence of some level of material wealth. And if the society’s self-determination is 
threatened, following the same reasoning, its self-respect is threatened. However, 
Rawls would respond by saying a sufficient degree of material wealth—sufficient for 
their ability to secure for themselves their autonomy, self-sufficiency, and a well-
ordered structure—would fall under the one’s duty of assistance. This does not, Rawls 
would say, require a global difference principle.  
 
Refusal to acknowledge or fully understand the implications of the difference between 
peoples and individuals is a potential cause to why Brock, and other critics of Rawls, 
take his work to be inconsistent—in the sense that the principles of justice need not 
apply globally in the way they are to apply domestically. Rawls’ point still stands that 
the difference principle ought to apply domestically but not globally (and this is not a 
matter of inconsistency) because individuals cannot live independent of other 
individuals in the way that peoples can live independent of other peoples.  
 
Criticisms in Brocks’ book based on the interdependencies of sates in the current global 
order seem to miss the point of Rawls’ work. Rawls’ project, correctly understood, is 
not open to this type of attack because Rawls’ work is to approach international justice 
based not on the current climate or order of relations but based on a climate or 
particular order one could—within reason—hope for (hence the purpose of the LP, as 
Brock acknowledges, is to consider the possibility of a realistic utopia and to define 
what constitutes the realistic utopia). Rawls’ realistic utopia, Rawls wants to say, is 
realistic in the sense that it “takes people as they are” and it accommodates for cultural 
pluralism and it respects people’s fundamental interest in self-determination (LP, 13). 
So Rawls’ work is based on a global climate one could within reason hope for rather 
than on the global climate that is.  
 
Central to Rawls’ LP is what is referred to in his earlier work as an “overlapping 
consensus” among delegates concerning principles of justice. It does not seem to be the 
case that, as Rawls’ critics want to suggest, he changes his position. He still keeps his 
Kantian position that the individual is of moral worth and that the state is only 
legitimate insofar as the state recognizes this. It is not that Rawls changes his position, 
it is that different conditions from individuals on a domestic level and peoples on a 
global level apply. Rawls never changes his position from TJ to PL and on through LP 
on this point. Rawls would say peoples, like individuals, are moral agents worthy of 
respect; where the difference lies is in their capacity for independence. 
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It seems that even the defenses of Rawls’ LP offered by Brock in response to 
cosmopolitan criticisms miss the implications of the distinction between peoples and 
individuals with respect to global justice. Defenders of Rawls, as Brock points out, 
want to say that Rawls’ critics misinterpret what Rawls’ project is about and that, “he 
aims to establish under what condition we can secure a ‘peaceful and stable’ world 
order, rather than one which is ‘just’” (p. 31). While this may or may not be true, this 
defense of Rawls still seems to miss the point—and the justification—of why under a 
second original position different principles would be chosen. It is not that Rawls 
changes his position, it is that different conditions from individuals on a domestic level 
and peoples on a global level apply. Rawls never changes his position from TJ to PL 
and on through LP on this point. Rawls would say peoples, like individuals, are moral 
agents worthy of respect; where the difference lies is in their capacities for 
independence.  
 
Contrary to Brock’s cosmopolitan critique in Global Justice, Rawls never abandons his 
two principles of justice. Rawls stays committed to his two principles of justice as 
being the way in which peoples on a domestic level ought to be structured. It is not that 
Rawls abandons his principles, it is simply that Rawls refuses—due to the consistency 
liberalism requires of us—to say his principles can be forced upon unwilling states. 
Even the defenses of Rawls’ LP that Brock provides fail to acknowledge this point. 
 
Rawls’ point is that while complete self-sufficiency among individuals cannot 
reasonably be expected, self-sufficiency of peoples or, rather, the potential for self-
sufficiency of peoples can be. A global “difference principle” is a threat to a peoples’ 
self-determination and, subsequently, to its reasonable degree of self-respect whereas 
agreeing to a duty of assistance is not. It is for this reason that delegates in a second 
original position will reach an overlapping consensus regarding these principles of 




In this paper I have shown that the Rawlsian project, correctly understood, is not as 
threatened by cosmopolitan criticisms as Brock seems to suggest. I have done this by 
showing that Rawls’ approach to international justice is based not on the current 
climate or order of international relations but based on a climate or particular order one 
could—within reason—hope for. That is, the Rawlsian project is concerned also with 
defining a realistic utopia.  
 
Another reason I provided for why the Rawlsian project is not threatened is by 
suggesting that perhaps what is overlooked by both critics and defenders of Rawls is 
the implication of the fundamental difference between peoples on global level and 
individuals on a domestic level (with respect to global justice). That difference being 
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peoples’ ability to live independent of other peoples—in a way that individuals 
cannot—and the desire for the self-respect that comes of it.  
 
Finally, I have suggested that despite the common cosmopolitan responses, consistency 
does not require the principles of distributive justice be extended globally; rather, as 
Rawls would respond, it is not that Rawls abandons his principles, it is simply that 
Rawls refuses—due to the consistency liberalism requires of us—to say his principles 
are to be forced upon unwilling states. 
 
                                                          
*I thank Marcus Arvan for his helpful comments.  
 
1 Rawls’ point here is that a peoples, if not already self-sufficient, have the capacity to 
become self-sufficient. The justification for Rawls’ rejection of a global difference 
principle (and my argument for Rawls’ consistency that I base on Rawls’ commitment 
to self-respect) hinges on the idea that a peoples can live independently of other peoples 
in a way that an individual cannot. 
 
2 It is my intention to show that by selecting different principles, Rawls is securing the 
interests behind the principles rather than securing the principles themselves. And the 
interests being secured are consistent with Rawls’ earlier commitments.   
 
3 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 
p. 37. 
 
4 Samuel Freeman suggests many misunderstand the purpose of Rawls’ work.  
 
5 Rawls argues that “perhaps the most important primary good is that of self-respect” 
(TJ, sec. 67) and that without self-respect people will doubt their own worth and their 
ability to carry out their life goals. Rawls argues in both TJ and PL for the importance of 
self-respect: 
 
“The importance of self-respect is that it provides a secure sense of our own 
value, a firm conviction that our determinate conception of the good is worth 
carrying out. Without self-respect nothing may seem worth doing, and if some 
things have value for us, we lack the will to pursue them. Thus, the parties give 
weight to how well principles of justice support self-respect…” (PL, p. 318). 
 
Stressing the importance of self-respect, on a domestic level Rawls gives lexical priority 
to the liberty principle over a difference principle and argues that the Priority of Liberty 
serves as “the basis for self-respect” (TJ, sec. 39). 
 
6 Note that priority is not given to full liberty, but equal liberty (e.g., not full liberty of 
conscience, but equal liberty of conscience). Remember, equal social status cannot be 
guaranteed but, via the liberty principle, equal citizenship can.  
 
7 It is because a global difference principle is a threat to a peoples’ state self-
determination that it is rejected.  
